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a b s t r a c t 
I study the effect of dynamic firm entry, scale economies and oligopolistic competition on 
measured productivity. These features cause endogenous, procyclical, fluctuations in mea- 
sured productivity (Solow residual). I analytically decompose measured productivity into a 
pure technology component and an endogenous component. I show that the endogenous 
component arises because dynamic firm entry and oligopolistic competition cause firms to 
vary their optimal production which in turn interacts with returns to scale generating pro- 
ductivity effects. I estimate the pure technology series which shows that it is less volatile 
and more persistent than a standard Solow residual. Lastly, I simulate the model with the 
pure technology process and show that the model mechanisms generate output amplifica- 
tion relative to a benchmark monopolistic competition, static entry, model. 
Crown Copyright © 2021 Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. 
 
 
Recent empirical discussions of the US macroeconomy have focused on underlying product market structures. Specifically 
the behaviour of price markups, economic profits, scale economies and business dynamism (firm entry and exit). 2 In this 
paper, I develop a tractable dynamic general equilibrium model that endogenously determines each of these features, and 
I analyse the implications for productivity measurement and output amplification. This contributes to a well-established 
literature which shows that in the absence of perfect competition and constant returns to scale, a Solow residual measure of
productivity does not capture true shifts in an economy’s production function ( Basu and Fernald, 2001; Hall, 1989 ). That is,
a Solow residual is a biased measure of technology, where a Solow residual refers to detrended output less share-weighted 
detrended inputs and technology refers to a Hicks-neutral shifter in the production function. I extend this literature by 
analysing the dynamic interaction of sluggish firm entry, oligopolistic competition and increasing returns to scale. ∗ corresponding author. 
E-mail address: asavagar@gmail.com 
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Stephen Millard, Martin Kaae Jensen, David Collie, Jonathan Haskel, Nobu Kiyotaki, Esteban Rossi-Hansberg, Fernando Leibovici, Sungki Hong, Mehdi Sahneh, 
Mathan Satchi, Maarten De Ridder, Vasco Carvalho, Alex Clymo, Nick Kozeniauskas, Joaquim Oliveira Martins, Frederic Dufourt and funders: ESRC, Julian 
Hodge Institute and RES. I appreciate the hospitality of KU Leuven and St Louis Fed. 
2 Barkai (2020) ; De Loecker et al. (2020) ; Decker et al. (2018) present evidence of rising market power and declining business dynamism, whilst 
Basu (2019) ; Syverson (2019) discuss the limitations. 
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I provide empirical evidence that following an exogenous technology shock, aggregate output initially responds through 
incumbent firms expanding their production before new firm entry occurs. I develop a model that replicates this observation 
and show that these firm-level intensive margin variations create endogenous productivity effects. I analytically decompose 
measured productivity into a pure technology component and an endogenous component. I estimate the pure technology 
series and show that it is less volatile and more persistent than a Solow residual measure. Finally, I simulate the model of
endogenous markups and dynamic entry and show that it generates significant output amplification relative to a benchmark 
imperfect competition model with constant markups and instantaneous entry. 
I extend a neoclassical growth model with endogenous labour to include richer industrial organization features. There 
is no heterogeneity and the main model is in continuous time. The model consists of a representative household and rep-
resentative firm. The household can invest in capital or firms. A dynamic arbitrage condition ensures the two assets yield 
the same return. The three key model features are dynamic entry, oligopolistic competition and increasing returns to scale. 
Dynamic entry leads to non-zero economic profits in the short run, whilst oligopolistic competition leads to endogenous 
markups. Endogenous markups imply that markups are a function of the number of firms. The model has both a one-off
sunk entry cost and a period-by-period fixed overhead cost. Both of these costs are output denominated. 
Dynamic entry refers to entry that is sluggish. The number of firms becomes a state variable similar to capital in a tradi-
tional real business cycle (RBC) model. In my model the lag in firm entry is caused by an endogenous entry cost. Specifically,
I assume that there is a convex entry adjustment cost that depends on the flow of entry due to some congestion effect or
other externality. The endogenous entry cost creates an intertemporal zero-profit condition (dynamic arbitrage condition) 
that equates the cost of entry in an instance to the net present value of incumbency. Consequently, entry sluggishly adjusts
to its long-run level as potential entrants evaluate whether to enter or wait for entry costs to fall in a future period with
less congestion. In the long run, the arbitrage condition yields a free-entry steady-state condition that causes zero profit 
and no entry. By having no entry and economic profits in the short-run (on impact) and full adjustment with zero profits
in the long run (steady state), the model captures a traditional Marshallian definition of the short run and the long run.
This is also consistent with classic Chamberlinian monopolistic competition. Traditionally macroeconomic models have ei- 
ther instantaneous entry ( Comin and Gertler, 2006; Devereux et al., 1996; Jaimovich and Floetotto, 2008 ) or a fixed number
of firms ( Hornstein, 1993; Rotemberg and Woodford, 1993 ). These outcomes are special cases of the model I develop. 
Oligopolistic competition refers to the form of strategic interaction among firms. It implies that firms are large in their in-
dustry, but small in the macroeconomy. Therefore, firms take into consideration their own-output effect on industry output 
when maximizing profits. 3 This differs from a standard Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition framework which yields con- 
stant markups ( Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977 ). In the Dixit-Stiglitz framework firms are infinitesimal. 4 They do not consider their
indirect effect on industry-level output and consequently markups are constant. However, when firms account for their in- 
direct effect, markups depend negatively on the number of firms. Entry reduces markups because firms have a lower market 
share, and thus have a weaker effect on industry-level outcomes. An early version of this model of strategic interaction is
used in Devereux and Lee (2001) , and Dos Santos Ferreira and Dufourt (2006) develop a simple version in a DGE business
cycle setting. Recently, it has been popularised by Atkeson and Burstein (2008) in a heterogeneous firm setting. 
Scale economies are caused by a fixed cost and increasing marginal costs due to decreasing returns to scale in variable
production. This yields firms with U-shaped average cost curves. This setup allows for increasing returns, constant returns or 
decreasing returns. There are increasing returns on the left-hand side of the U, whilst the fixed cost dominates the increasing
marginal costs. There are constant returns at minimum average cost where marginal cost and average cost intersect. There 
are decreasing returns as the rising marginal cost exceeds the average cost on the right-hand side of the U. In steady-state,
under imperfect competition the economy has increasing returns to scale. It operates where average cost exceeds marginal 
cost and price exceeds marginal cost implying there is a price markup. Under perfect competition, firms would operate at 
the minimum of their average cost curve at minimum efficient scale . At this point there are locally constant returns to scale
and the endogenous productivity effects I discuss disappear. 
In the model a positive technology shock causes profits, entry, employment, investment, entry costs and productivity 
to increase, whilst markups and returns to scale decrease. To understand this mechanism consider a permanent, positive 
technology shock. On impact the shock affects a fixed number of incumbent firms since firm entry cannot respond due 
to adjustment costs. Consequently, incumbent firms bear the shock and raise their output to satisfy the additional demand. 
They adjust output through labour which is the only input that can respond instantaneously. The increase in incumbent firm 
size improves returns to scale and causes an endogenous increase in productivity. By utilizing their returns to scale from 
the fixed cost, the incumbent firms get closer to the efficient level of production at minimum average cost where there are
locally constant returns to scale. Hence despite benefiting from returns to scale, the level of returns to scale decreases as
output expands. Given markups and sluggish firm entry, the short-run rise in incumbents’ output corresponds one-to-one 
with a short-run rise in operating profits. Thus initially measured productivity does not reflect solely the technology shock 
but also a returns to scale effect from expanded output which maps exactly to profits. During transition, the rise in profits
attracts entry. As entry occurs, it decreases incumbents’ output and profits which reduces the scale effect. Entry reducing 3 In my model firms consider own-output effects because they compete under Cournot. It could also be solved for Bertrand where the firm considers 
own-price effect on industry price level, as in Etro and Colciago (2010) ; Lewis and Poilly (2012) . 
4 Yang and Heijdra (1993) stress that the Dixit-Stiglitz constant markup result is an approximation. Since products are defined on a finite set, own-price 
effects should be considered, but these indirect effects are approximately zero as the number of firms tends to infinity. 
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incumbent output is known as a business stealing effect ( Mankiw and Whinston, 1986 ). In addition to a business stealing
effect, entry also causes a competition effect ( Lewis and Poilly, 2012 ). The competition effect decreases markups. Falling
markups increases incumbents’ output. Lower markups raise output because firms must produce more units to generate 
the revenue to cover fixed costs when each unit solid has a lower price markup. This enhances the scale effect. Hence,
during transition entry has opposing effects on firm-level output and in turn measured productivity. It reduces firm size, 
via business stealing (profit arbitrage), which decreases the scale effect, but it also increases firm size, via competition 
decreasing markups, which increases the scale effect. The relative importance and persistence of the two effects depends 
on the speed of firm adjustment i.e. business dynamism. In the long-run steady state, with a permanently higher level of
firms, profits return to zero but markups are decreased to a permanently lower level. Consequently in zero profit steady- 
state, firms must produce more output in order to generate the revenue to cover fixed costs given the lower markup on
each unit. Therefore in the long-run firms are larger and there is a long-run scale effect increasing measured productivity. 
Firm-level returns to scale and firm-level intensive margin variation are both necessary and jointly they are sufficient for the 
endogenous productivity effect. In a benchmark model of monopolistic competition (constant markups à la Dixit Stiglitz) 
with fixed overhead costs and instantaneous entry (zero profits), firm output is constant. There is no intensive margin 
variation. Therefore, despite returns to scale and imperfect competition, there are no dynamic distortions. 5 Similarly, even if 
there are intensive margin variations but there are constant returns to scale, there are no dynamic distortions. This occurs 
in the model at the perfectly competitive equilibrium. Hence neither a benchmark monopolistic competition model nor a 
perfectly competitive model satisfy these conditions. 
It is well-documented that the interaction between imperfect competition, increasing returns to scale and technol- 
ogy shocks can explain procylical productivity ( Basu, 1996; Basu and Fernald, 2001; Jaimovich and Floetotto, 2008 ). I
add to this literature by decomposing measured productivity into pure technology and endogenous components in the 
presence of dynamic entry, oligopolistic competition and increasing returns to scale. My paper is most closely related to 
Bilbiie et al. (2012) ; Devereux et al. (1996) ; Etro and Colciago (2010) ; Jaimovich and Floetotto (2008) , all of whom develop
RBC models with endogenous firm entry. 6 Devereux et al. (1996) ; Jaimovich and Floetotto (2008) develop models with in-
creasing returns to scale and endogenous entry, but entry is static: it adjusts instantaneously due to a zero-profit condition. 
Whereas, Bilbiie et al. (2012) ; Etro and Colciago (2010) develop models of dynamic entry due to a time-to-build lag in firm
creation, but returns to scale are constant. 7 My work emphasizes that linking both dynamic entry and increasing returns 
amplifies exogenous shocks and causes endogenous productivity effects. Furthermore, my setup allows me to distil pure 
technology and provide a tractable intertemporal decomposition of measured productivity. 
Bilbiie et al. (2012) is the seminal work on dynamic firm entry in a business cycle framework. 8 They show that dy-
namic entry is an important propagation mechanism of exogenous shocks that leads to quantitative improvements over the 
benchmark RBC model. Unlike my paper, the authors do not focus on distilling pure technology or explaining endogenous 
productivity movements due to returns to scale. They simulate their model with a technology shock process commonly used 
in other papers and based on King and Rebelo (1999) . This technology shock process is estimated from a technology series
acquired under the assumption of perfect competition. It is not the model-consistent technology series when there is imper- 
fect competition and dynamic entry. The authors stress this point in their paper ( Bilbiie et al., 2012 , p. 321), but they also
explain that an advantage of using a common technology shock process is model comparability. It is clearer to compare the
model’s internal propagation mechanism relative to other models that also use the same technology process, rather chang- 
ing the model equations and the exogenous technology process. An advantage of the dynamic entry cost setup that I use –
with zero-profits in steady state – is that the aggregate production function is tractable. This allows me to identify a model-
consistent technology with dynamic entry, imperfect competition and increasing returns. My aim of gaining a tractable 
understanding of productivity is closer to Jaimovich and Floetotto (2008) . They identify a model-consistent technology se- 
ries with static entry and oligopolistic (Bertrand) competition. They show that the framework can explain 40% of variation in 
measured TFP and creates significant output amplification. 9 They have globally increasing returns to scale, rather than allow- 
ing for a perfect competition outcome as in my analysis with U-shaped average cost curves. In Savagar and Dixon (2020) we
study a similar model to this paper but with constant markups and we relate short-run endogenous productivity to capacity 
utilization. Constant markups allow us to take a more tractable approach but trivializes intensive margin variations leading 
to a theoretical, rather than quantitative, focus. 5 Benchmark imperfect competition is a steady-state distortion. At a first-order approximation it does not affect model dynamics realtive to a perfect 
competition RBC model. 
6 Other papers with related model setups are Ambler and Cardia (1998) ; Basu and Fernald (2001) ; Chatterjee and Cooper (2014) ; Cook (2001) ; 
Hornstein (1993) ; Kim (2004) ; Portier (1995) ; Rotemberg and Woodford (1993) . These papers feature some combination of: dynamic or static entry; con- 
stant or endogenous markups; increasing returns or constant returns. 
7 These papers have external returns to scale implicit in the CES aggregator. These are typically referred to as variety effects ( Ethier, 1982 ) when entering 
in the consumption aggregator as in Bilbiie et al. (2012) or returns to specialization ( Bénassy, 1996; Devereux et al., 1996 ) when entering in the output 
aggregator as in Etro and Colciago (2010) . 
8 Ambler and Cardia (1998) ; Cook (2001) develop early work moving from static to dynamic entry. They impose that zero-profits hold in expectation 
similar to Hopenhayn (1992) . A shock causes profit variation as firms are predetermined but the following period entry fully adjusts to arbitrage profits. 
9 In a supplementary appendix, Jaimovich and Floetotto (2008) include dynamic entry as a robustness check. They find that it causes weaker amplification 
than their main result. This is a quantitative robustness exercise that does not elaborate on the mechanisms. 
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The papers by Bilbiie et al. (2012) ; Etro and Colciago (2010) ; Jaimovich and Floetotto (2008) all include endogenous
markups that are countercylical due to procyclical firm entry. Procylical firm entry is well-documented ( Tian, 2018 ), whereas
countercylical markups are debated. Bilbiie et al. (2012) investigate endogenous markups caused by demand-side comple- 
mentarities when there are translog preferences à la Feenstra (2003) . Etro and Colciago (2010) study supply-side oligopolistic 
competition markups, similar to my work. They show that both Cournot and Bertrand forms of strategic interaction improve 
RBC moment matching. Lewis and Poilly (2012) estimate the size of the competition effect under the demand-side translog 
approach and supply-side oligopolistic approach. They find the competition effect is stronger under the translog approach. I 
favour the supply-side Cournot approach because it is more relevant for firm entry, whereas demand-side complementarities 
seem more relevant for product entry as in Bilbiie et al. (2012) . 
I employ an endogenous entry cost model based on the partial equilibrium model of Datta and Dixon (2002) and gen-
eral equilibrium, perfect competition model of Brito and Dixon (2013) . The endogenous entry cost setup aids my tractable
analysis in continuous-time as entry costs tend to zero in the long-run implying a zero-profit steady state and equivalence 
between cost shares and revenue shares. The importance of endogenous entry costs are widely recognised in industrial or- 
ganization literature. In particular, the entry cost setup I use is similar to Das and Das (1997) . Recently, entry congestion
effects have been adopted in several macroeconomic models such as Berentsen and Waller (2015) ; Bergin et al. (2016) ;
Bergin and Lin (2012) ; Boar and Midrigan (2020) ; Gutiérrez et al. (2019) ; Lewis and Poilly (2012) ; Poutineau and Verman-
del (2015) and also in finance by Loualiche (2019) . Lewis (2009) provides empirical evidence on the importance of the entry
congestion channel for monetary policy transmission. Entry congestion effects are typically motivated by advertising costs 
or some factor required to setup a firm that is in inelastic supply. In Aloi et al. (2021) we interpret congestion as a queuing
dynamic which may result from regulatory barriers to entry such as business permits. We present empirical evidence that 
such procedures slow firm creation. In our framework entry and exit are symmetric for tractability, however recent literature 
in firm dynamics considers endogenous exit ( Clementi and Palazzo, 2016; Hamano and Zanetti, 2017; Rossi, 2019 ). In mod-
els with endogenous exit and heterogeneous firms, productivity is countercyclical. During a recession more firms fall below 
the productivity threshold for survival, hence the remaining incumbents are of higher average productivity. Our mechanism 
provides a counter-veiling effect that as firms shrink in size they benefit less from scale economies and hence productivity 
falls, leading to a procylical measured productivity which is consistent with empirical evidence ( Fernald and Wang, 2016 ).
Lastly, the paper is related to recent work by Baqaee and Farhi (2020) that provides non-parametric, static decompositions 
of measured productivity for economies with heterogeneity and inefficiencies. The focus of my paper is more parametric 
and the decompositions are dynamic. There is no role for selection or reallocation. 
Section 1 presents VAR evidence on the response of firm entry and output to a technology shock. Section 2 sets
up the model environment. Section 3 solves household and firm optimization problems and characterises equilibrium. 
Section 4 decomposes measured productivity and estimates a model-consistent technology series. Section 5 simulates the 
model. Section 6 concludes. 
1. Empirical evidence 
The mechanism I explore in this paper rests on output per firm (intensive margin) adjusting in the short run and inter-
acting with scale economies, whereas over time firm entry (extensive margin) adjusts which alleviates the short-run scale 
effect. In this section I provide empirical evidence that aggregate output responds faster than the number of firms follow- 
ing a technology shock. This implies variations in firm intensive margin are present in the short-run, but dissipate in the
long-run as the extensive margin of firm entry adjusts. 
Figure 1 presents orthogonalized impulse response functions for aggregate output and the number of firms following a 
one unit shock to the residual of the technology regression. The technology shock is identified through a recursive ordering 
that is consistent with the theory in the paper. The VAR order implies that a technology shock affects technology contem-
poraneously, it then affects output one period later and the combined change in technology and output affect the number 
of firms after two periods. This mirrors the mechanism of the theoretical model where an exogenous technology shock is 
initially borne by incumbents who adjust output through labour and subsequently gain profits which attracts entrants and 
alters the number of firms. The results follow from a VAR with four lags applied to quarterly US data that is logged and
detrended with a second-order polynomial. The VAR results present 90% bootstrap confidence intervals (10,0 0 0 runs). The 
technology series is constructed as the model-consistent technology series I derive later in the paper. The results are robust 
to alternative detrending techniques (no detrend ‘VAR in levels’, first-order and fourth-order) and lag lengths. The VAR esti- 
mation includes constant and trend components. I provide a supplementary appendix that shows these exercises. The data 
on output is real GDP in 2012 prices taken from FRED (FRED/GDPC1); the number of firms series is taken from BLS Busi-
ness Employment Dynamics (BED) which gives quarterly births and deaths from 1992. To construct the technology series I 
use capital from historical BLS capital service accounts and linearly interpolate from annual to quarterly; hours are Nonfarm 
Business Sector: Hours of All Persons (index 2012) (FRED/HOANBS). I provide supplementary replication files which provide 
full details of the data and robustness checks with alternative capital interpolation methods and a measure of number of 
firms from the BLS quarterly census of employment and wages (QCEW). The data are population adjusted, logged and then 
detrended. 
The results support the mechanism that drives the results in this paper. The short-run adjustment of firms is much 
slower and smaller in magnitude than the response of aggregate output. This implies that on average, output per firm, 4 
A. Savagar Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 133 (2021) 104232 









rises on impact of the shock. The contribution of the intensive margin on impact is more important than the extensive
margin, but the extensive margin grows in importance as entry adjusts. In the remainder of the paper, I will show that in
an economy with increasing returns to scale, this dynamic will create short-run endogenous productivity movements. 
2. Model setup 
This section describes the model economy. It presents the primitives that characterise households and firms and their 
objectives and constraints. 
2.1. Household 
A representative household chooses consumption { C(t) } ∞ 
0 
∈ R , labour supply { L (t) } ∞ 
0 
∈ [0 , 1] and firm entry (firm invest-
ment) { E(t) } ∞ 0 ∈ R to maximise lifetime utility U : R 2 → R subject to the evolution of state variables capital { K(t) } ∞ 0 ∈ R + 
and number of firms { N(t) } ∞ 0 ∈ [1 , ∞ ) . 
Assumption 1. Instantaneous utility u : R × [0 , 1] → R satisfies 
1. Strictly increasing in consumption and strictly decreasing in labour u C > 0 , u L < 0 . 
2. Inada conditions on consumption and labour supply hold 
lim 
L →∞ 
u L = −∞ , lim 
C→∞ 
u C = 0 , lim 
L → 0 + 
u L = 0 , lim 
C→ 0 + 
u C = + ∞ . 
3. Twice differentiable with diminishing marginal utilities u LL , u CC ≤ 0 . 
4. Additively separable u CL = u LC = 0 . 10 
The household maximizes utility subject to a budget constraint which states that expenditure on consumption, capital 
investment and firm investment equates to income from renting capital, wages from labour and profits from owning firms 
C(t) + I(t) + Z(t) = rK(t) + wL (t) + πN(t) . (1) 
The household takes equilibrium rental rate, wage rate and firm profits r, w, π ∈ R + , which are in consumption good
prices, as given. Capital investment I(t) ≡ ˙ K (t) is given by the flow of capital as there is no depreciation. Firm investment
Z(t) ≡ (ζ / 2) ̇ N 2 is given by a quadratic entry cost that depends on the flow of entry. This represents a congestion effect in
firm entry. The parameter ζ ∈ (0 , ∞ ) controls the congestion effect. As ζ → 0 , congestion disappears, entry adjusts instan-
taneously, and profits are always zero. As ζ → ∞ , the model has a fixed number of firms. ρ ∈ R + is the household discount
factor. 
10 Additive separability and diminishing marginal utility imply that u is concave in (C, L ) since u CC u LL − u 2 CL > 0 always holds (negative semi-definite 
Hessian). 
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On the production side of the economy there is a nested CES aggregator. Aggregate output Y consists of a continuum
of industries j ∈ [0 , 1] each producing Q j . Industry output consists of N ≥ 1 firms each producing y j ı , ı ∈ 1 . . . N. At the
aggregate level and industry level there is perfect competition, whereas at the firm level there is oligopolistic competition. 
With oligopolistic competition, a firm can affect own-price P j ı through a direct effect, as with monopolistic competition, but 
also through an indirect effect via its effect on the industry level output. The result is an endogenous demand elasticity that
becomes more elastic with more firms, hence a markup that decreases in entry. Both levels of aggregation have constant 
returns (no variety effects). 11 
The aggregate output production function is 
Y (t) = 
[∫ 1 
0 





, θI ≥ 1 . (2) 
The aggregator has constant returns and θI ∈ [1 , ∞ ) is between-industry substitutability. 12 The industry output production 
function is 











, θF > θI ≥ 1 (3) 
The aggregator has constant returns (no variety effects) and θF ∈ (1 , ∞ ) is between-firm substitutability. The assumption
that θF > θI ensures that products within an industry are more substitutable than products in different industries. Firm ı in 
industry j produces output: 
y j ı (t) := max { AF (k j ı (t) ,  j ı (t)) − φ, 0 } (4) 
φ ∈ R + is an output-denominated overhead cost. 13 A ∈ R + is a scale parameter reflecting the production technology. 
Assumption 2. The production function F : R 2 + ⊇ (k,  ) → R + satisfies: 
(i) F is twice differentiable and strictly increasing in capital and labour: F k , F  > 0 . 
ii) The Inada conditions hold: 
lim 
k → 0 
F k (k,  ) = lim 
 → 0 
F  (k,  ) = ∞ , lim 
k →∞ 
F k (k,  ) = lim 
 →∞ 
F  (k,  ) = 0 , F (0 , 0) = 0 . 
ii) F is concave which implies 
F k = F k > 0 , F kk , F  < 0 , F kk F  − F 2 k > 0 . 
v) F is homogeneous of degree ν ∈ (0 , 1) which implies νF = F k k + F   . 
3. Equilibrium conditions 
3.1. Household equilibrium conditions 
The household solves 
max 
K,C,L,N,E 
U : = 
∞ ∫ 
0 
e −ρt u (C(t) , 1 − L (t)) dt 
s.t. ˙ K (t) = rK(t) + wL (t) + πN(t) − C(t) − ζ
2 
E(t) 2 (5) 
˙ N (t) = E(t) . (6) 
Initial conditions on the state variables are given by K(0) = K 0 and N(0) = N 0 . The optimal solutions satisfy 
w = − u L (L (t)) 
u C (C(t)) 
(7) 11 Returns to scale of the aggregate production functions are not the same as returns to scale at the firm level. Hence we have constant returns in the 
aggregate production functions, but increasing, constant or decreasing returns at the firm level. 
12 The θ = 1 should be specified as a Cobb-Douglas aggregator on a continuum. 
13 The fixed overhead parameter implies profits will be zero in steady-state despite market power. The overhead cost means that marginal costs do not 
measure returns to scale. We focus on the case where marginal costs are increasing, but average costs are decreasing, so there are (locally) increasing 
returns to scale. 
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˙ C = − u C (C(t)) 
u CC (C(t)) 
(r − ρ) (8) 
ζ ˙ E = rζE(t) − π. (9) 




e −ρt u C (C(t)) K(t) = 0 lim 
t→∞ 
e −ρt u C (C(t)) ζE(t) N(t) = 0 . (10) 
Together with the two initial conditions, there are four boundary conditions corresponding to the four differential equa- 
tions. Equation (7) is the intratemporal condition between consumption and labour and equation (8) is the intertemporal 
consumption condition. Equation (9) is a firm asset pricing equation. It states there is no arbitrage between investing in 
firms and capital. To see this note that s (t) ≡ ζE(t) is the relative price of a firm (in units of marginal utility). 14 Hence the
arbitrage condition states that the return to owning a firm π plus the change in firm value ζ ˙ E equates to the return on the
entry cost invested in capital r × ζE(t) . 
3.2. Firm equilibrium conditions 
The final goods and sectoral goods producers maximize profits subject to their production functions which have constant 
return to scale. They operate under perfect competition so treat prices as given. The resulting inverse demands take constant 
elasticity form. 
Final Goods Problem 
Final goods producers solve: 
max 




Q j P j d j
subject to (2) . The first-order condition gives inverse demand for industry j






P, ∀ j ∈ [0 , 1] . (11) 








Sectoral Goods Problem 
Sectoral good producers solve: 
max 
y j ı , ı ∈ (1 ... N) 
P j Q j −
N ∑ 
1 
y j ı P j ı 
subject to (3) . The first-order condition gives inverse demand for intermediate producer ı in sector j as follows 
P j ı = 
(






θF P j . (13) 
The corresponding price index is: 
P j = 
( 
N ∑ 





14 Marginal utility u C is the shadow price of consumption and u C ζE(t) is the shadow price of a firm. Therefore s (t) is the shadow price of a firm relative 
to the shadow price of consumption. Hence s (t) ≡ ζE(t) is the value of an additional firm in consumption unit terms. 
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The individual firm operates under Cournot competition. When choosing output to maximize profits they recognise that 
this affects industry demand. The strength of this effect depends on their market share which causes an endogenous markup. 
The firm solves its production decision in two stages. First, the firm decides optimal input choices to produce a given output
through cost minimization. Second, the firm decides optimal output to maximize profits. This illustrates that firms face non- 
constant marginal cost curves. 
To choose inputs optimally for a given level of output, the firm solves 
C(w, r, y j ı ) := min 
k j ,ı , j ,ı 
w j ,ı + rk j ,ı 
s.t. y j ı ≤ AF (k j ı ,  j ı ) − φ (15) 
where factor prices are in final good prices w ≡ w nom . /P and r ≡ r nom . /P . The optimality conditions are: 
r = λj ı AF k (k,  ) w = λj ı AF  (k,  ) y j ı + φ = AF (k j ı ,  j ı ) . (16)
where λj ı is the Lagrange multiplier which is equal to the marginal cost at the optimal levels of k,  . Using the optimality
conditions and Euler’s homogeneous function theorem, we can represent the cost function as 
C(w, r, y j ı ) = ∂C(w, r, y j ı ) 
∂y j ı 
ν(y j ı + φ) . (17) 
Integrating this partial differential equation gives the cost function in multiplicatively-separable form where G (r, w, 1) is an 
arbitrary function independent of y j ı : 
C(r, w, y j ı ) = 
(




G (r, w, 1) . (18) 
Therefore the marginal cost is 
MC ≡ ∂C(w, r, y j ı ) 
∂y j ı 
= 1 
ν
C(r, w, y j ı ) 






y j ı + φ
) 1 
ν −1 G (r, w, 1) > 0 . (19) 
The elasticity of the cost function with respect to output is ε C y = [ ν(1 + s φ )] −1 , which we later define as returns to scale.
The elasticity of the marginal cost curve with respect to output is ε MC y = (1 − ν) ε C y . 15 This shows that the marginal cost is
increasing if ν ∈ (0 , 1) , constant if ν = 1 , and decreasing if ν ∈ (1 , ∞ ) . 
Given the cost function the firm maximizes profits subject to inverse demand. Inverse demand follows from combining 
aggregate and sectoral demand functions. Therefore the firm solves 
max 
y j ,ı 
πj ı = P j ı 
P 
y j ı − C(w, r, y j ı ) 
s.t. 




y j ı 










θF . (20) 
Operating profits are in final good prices π ≡ πnom . /P . The first-order condition implies a firm chooses output such that 
marginal revenue equals to marginal cost, which implies that a firm chooses y j ı to satisfy 
μj ı = εj ı 
εj ı − 1 (21) 
where μj ı ∈ (1 , ∞ ) is the markup of price over marginal cost and εj ı ∈ (1 , ∞ ) is the price elasticity of demand. They are
defined as follows: 
εj ı ≡ −∂y j ı 
∂P j ı 
P j ı 
y j ı 
and μj ı ≡ P j ı /P 
∂C(w, r, y j ı ) /∂y j ı 
. (22) 
The firm-level inverse demand (20) and industry-level production function (3) , yield an expression for the price elasticity of 
demand 












∂y j ı 




∂Q j ı 
∂y j ı 
y j ı 




j ı ∑ N 





The price elasticity depends on exogenous between-firm and between-industry substitutability and endogenous industry elas- 
ticity to own-output. The industry elasticity to own output is equal to market share. 16 Dividing the optimal input choice15 Throughout the paper, for two variables X, Y the notation ε Y X represents the elasticity of Y with respect to X , that is ε Y X ≡ ∂Y ∂X X Y = ∂ ln X ∂ ln Y . 
16 The special cases of a single-firm market and many-firm market occur when the share is 1 or 0. 
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conditions by P j ı /P allows us to write them in terms of the markup: 
w = P j ı 
P 
AF  (k j ı ,  j ı ) 
μj ı 
, r = P j ı 
P 
AF k (k j ı ,  j ı ) 
μj ı 
. (24) 
Similarly the cost function is C(r, w, y j ı ) = P j ı P 
ν(y j ı + φ) 
μj ı 
. The wage and rental conditions in conjunction with the firm output
function and the markup pricing rule, which depends on aggregate and sectoral production functions, characterise equilib- 
rium production for the firm. 
3.3. Market clearing 







k j ı (t) 
] 






 j ı (t) 
] 
dj . (25) 
Goods market clearing implies output is divided among consumption, capital investment and firm investment Y (t) = C(t) + 
I(t) + Z(t) which implies 
Y (t) = C(t) + ˙ K + ζ
2 
E(t) 2 . (26) 
The entry cost is output-denominated implying both factors of production, capital and labour, are used to create new firms. 17 
3.4. Symmetric equilibrium 
The production function of a firm is symmetric with respect to all intermediate inputs. Therefore we study symmetric 
equilibria where all firms produce the same output and charge the same price. Under symmetry, intermediate variables are 
identical: 
∀ (j , ı ) ∈ [0 , 1] × [1 , N(t)] : y j ı = y, k j ı = k,  j ı = . 
The factor market clearing conditions imply 
K = Nk, L = N. (27) 
Since there are constant returns at the aggregate and sectoral output level, price and output aggregation is simple. 18 The
price indices show that all prices are equal under symmetry. We treat the final good as the numeraire therefore P = P j =
P j ı = 1 . Aggregate and industry demand imply 
Y = Q = Ny. (28) 














and the markup becomes 
μ(N) = 
[ 











where N ≥ 1 and θF > θI ≥ 1 . The markup is decreasing in the number of firms because entry decreases incumbents’ market
share 1 /N, which increases price elasticity, which decreases price setting ability. Note the following special cases. With 
homogeneous goods (perfectly substitutable goods within an industry) θF → ∞ and ε(N) = θI N then the markup is μ(N) =
θI N/ (θI N − 1) . A further simplification is to also assume θI = 1 (a Cobb-Douglas aggregator across the continuum of sectors
i.e. perfectly differentiated goods), which implies price elasticity of demand ε(N) = N and markup μ(N) = N/ (N − 1) . A
second special case, is to leave θI and θF but assume a continuum of single-firm industries such that N = 1 . In this case,
the price elasticity of demand is constant ε = θI and the markup is also constant μ = θI / (θI − 1) . This is the monopolistic
competition, or Dixit-Stiglitz, case. In the general case, the elasticity of the markup with respect to the number of firms is























< 0 . (30) 
Firm-level output combined with aggregate output implies: 
Y = N 1 −νAF (K, L ) − Nφ. (31) 17 An alternative approach is to have a labour-denominated entry cost which requires a second sector producing new firms with separate labour. This 
limits tractability and is more intuitive in papers with labour-only production functions. The labour-denominated entry cost could create a new channel 
where entry increases labour demand, increases wages, and dampens labour responses. A channel similar to this is present in this paper due to decreasing 
returns to variable inputs ( ν < 1 ) which causes entry to increase labour demand and wages. The result follows from equation (33) . 
18 This is the supply-side equivalent of there being no variety effects. 
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Labour Supply w = − u L (L ) 
u C (C) 
Consumption Euler ˙ C = − u C (C) 
u CC (C) 
(r − ρ) 
Entry Arbitrage ζ ˙ E = rζE − π
Budget Constraint ˙ K = rK + wL + πN − C − ζ
2 
E 2 
Entry Rate ˙ N = E
Firm 
Markup (Cournot) μ = 
[










Labour Demand w = 1 μ AN 1 −νF L (K, L ) 
Capital Rental r = 1 μ AN 1 −νF K (K, L ) 
Aggregate Output Y = AN 1 −νF (K, L ) − Nφ
Market Clearing 










The factor market equilibrium conditions become 
r = 1 
μ(N) 
AN 1 −νF K (K, L ) (32) 
w = 1 
μ(N) 
AN 1 −νF L (K, L ) . (33) 
Definition 1. An equilibrium consists of paths of consumption, entry, labour, capital, firms, wages, capital rental and oper- 
ating profits 
[ C(t) , E(t) , L (t) , K(t) , N(t) , w (t) , r(t) , π(t) ] 
∞ 
t=0 , 
such that the representative household maximizes its utility given initial asset holdings of capital ( K(0) > 0 ) and firms
( N(0) ≥ 1 ) and taking the time path of prices and profits [ w (t) , r(t) , π(t) ] ∞ t=0 as given; firms maximize profits taking the 
time path of factor prices [ w (t) , r(t) ] 
∞ 
t=0 as given; and factor prices and profits [ w (t) , r(t) , π(t) ] 
∞ 
t=0 are such that all markets 
clear. 
Table 1 summarises the equilibrium conditions under symmetry. The model conditions form a system of ten equations 
in ten endogenous variables (Y, r, w, π, μ, L, C, E, K, N) . The model reduces further to a four-dimensional dynamical system
in (C, E, K, N) . There are four boundary conditions given by the two initial conditions on the state variables and the two
transversality conditions on the state variables. Capital and number of the firms (K, N) are the state variables. Consumption 
and entry (C, E) are the jump variables. Labour is defined implicitly as L (C, K, N) through labour market equilibrium. 
3.4.1. Reduced-form optimal profit expression 
A crucial reduced-form relationship from the equilibrium conditions relates profits, output, markups and fixed costs. 
Combining the equilibrium conditions for the household budget constraint and goods market clearing condition yields an 
aggregate operating profits condition 
Nπ = Y − wL − rK. (34) 
Then if we substitute in equilibrium factor prices, we get a reduced-form optimal profit expression: 





(Y + N φ) − N φ. (35) 






(y + φ) − φ. (36) 
3.5. Steady-State equilibrium 
In steady-state equilibrium ˙ C = ˙ E = ˙ K = ˙ N = 0 at steady-state levels ˜ C , ̃  E , ˜ K , ˜ N , where tildes denote variables at steady
state. 19 In steady state the interest rate equals the discount factor ˜ r( ̃  C , ˜ K , ˜ N ) = ρ; profits are zero ˜ π( ̃  C , ˜ K , ˜ N ) = 0 ; output
equals consumption ˜ Y ( ̃  C , ˜ K , ˜ N ) = ˜ C and entry is zero ˜ E = 0 . The zero-profit outcome follows from the entry arbitrage equa-
tion and entry rate definition. It implies that in steady state costs and revenues are equal. Furthermore it allows us to
understand firm-level output behaviour. 19 The conditions are nonlinear, and steady-state may not be well-defined. 
10 










Proposition 1. Steady-state output per firm is increasing in the number of firms. 
˜ y = νφ
μ( ̃  N ) − ν . (37) 




(y + φ) − φ, then imposing zero profits and rearranging. A corollary to
the result is that the fixed-cost share ˜ sφ ≡ φ/ ̃  y is decreasing in the number of firms: ˜ sφ = μ( ̃
 N ) 
ν − 1 . The proposition arises
because output depends on the markup which is decreasing in the number of firms due to oligopolistic competition. The 
intuition is that entry decreases the markup so a firm increases output in order to generate enough revenue to cover fixed
costs in zero-profit steady state. 
3.6. Labour market 
We can understand labour market behaviour by equating labour supply with demand, then log-linearizing, which gives 
ˆ L (t) = ( ε u L L − ε F L L ) −1 
[
ˆ A + ε u C C ̂  C (t) + ε F L K ˆ K (t) − (ε F L K + ε F L L + ε μN ) ̂  N (t) 
]
(38) 
where hat notation represents deviation from steady state ˆ X ≡ ˙ X / ̃  X . 20 Given the assumptions on the production function 
and utility function, labour responds positively to technology, negatively to consumption, positively to capital and positively 
to number of firms. The number of firms coefficient is positive because ν < 1 and by Euler’s homogeneous function theorem
ε F L K + ε F L L = ν − 1 . 21 The elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption to further consumption is negative ( ε u C C < 0 ) due
to dimishing marginal utility. 
3.7. Scale economies 
Scale economies are defined as the inverse elasticity of costs to output, which is equal to the average cost to marginal
cost ratio: 
RTS ≡ ε −1 CY = [ C Y (Y/C)] −1 = AC / MC . (39) 
There are increasing returns if AC / MC ∈ (1 , ∞ ) , constant returns if AC / MC = 1 and decreasing returns if AC / MC ∈ (0 , 1) . Our
model setup has two expressions for returns to scale. The first is 




This measure of scale economies is based on technical parameters of the production function. It follows from dividing the 
optimal cost function, C = νMC (y + φ) , by y MC thus giving AC / MC . The second expression for returns to scale is 
RTS = μ(1 − s π ) , where s π = π
P y 
. (41) 
This measure of scale economies is based on behavioural factors relating to the decisions of profit-maximizing firms. It 
follows from the profit expression π = (P − AC ) y = 
(
1 − AC MC MC P 
)
P y = 
(
1 − RTS μ
)
P y . The two expressions for returns to scale
are linked via the reduced-form profit expression: 
RTS = ν
(
1 + s φ
)
= μ( 1 − s π )  1 . (42) 
This relates profit share, fixed cost share and the markup. If we (log-)linearize the two expressions we get 
ˆ RTS = ˆ μ − ˆ sπ (43) 
ˆ RTS = 
(
˜ sφ
1 + ˜ sφ
)





ˆ sφ, where ˆ sφ = − ˆ y (44) 
and we define ˆ sπ ≡ ˙ sπ . 22 The second expression emphasizes that returns to scale are countercyclical and will have a lower 
variance than the fixed cost share variance. The first expression shows that returns to scale are countercylical due to a
positive relationship with countercyclical markups and a negative relationship with procyclical profits. 20 In our quantitative model specification: ε u L L = η, ε F L L = β − 1 , ε F L K = α, ε u C C = −σ and ε μN is a nonlinear function of ˜ N , θI , θN where ˜ N in an intractable 
function of model parameters. 
21 The pre-multiplying reciprocal is strictly positive which ensures labour market equilibrium existence. It represents the difference between the gradients 
of the postively-sloped labour-supply curve ε Supply 
wL 
= ε u L L and negatively-sloped labour-demand curve ε Demand wL = ε F L L . 
22 The notation is inconsistent with our usual notation that ˆ X ≡ ˙ X / ̃ X because the profit-share are zero in steady state. 
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3.7.1. Scale economies in steady state 
Proposition 2. In steady state the markup and returns to scale are equivalent. Therefore there are increasing or constant returns
in steady state and steady-state returns to scale are increasing in the number of firms. 
˜ RTS = ν(1 + ˜ sφ ) = μ( ̃  N ) ≥ 1 (45) 
3.7.2. Scale economies in related literature 
In Etro and Colciago (2010) and Bilbiie et al. (2012) there are no overhead costs φ = 0 and marginal costs are constant
ν = 1 , therefore RTS = ν(1 + s φ ) = 1 or, by the equilibrium profit condition π = 
(
1 − 1 μ
)
y , then RTS = μ(1 − s π ) = 1 . 23 Even
though dynamic entry creates the same short-run intensive margin (output per firm) and long-run extensive margin (output 
across all firms) effects as in this paper, the firm size variations do not interact with scale economies, therefore there are
no endogenous productivity effects through this mechanism. In Jaimovich and Floetotto (2008) the production function 
has fixed costs φ > 0 and a flat marginal cost ν = 1 , with s π = 0 due to instantaneous entry. 24 Since there are always
zero profits, returns to scale are equivalent to the fixed cost and markup RTS = 1 + s φ = μ. Since there are zero profits N
is determined instantaneously. Consequently output and the fixed cost share are determined instantaneously following a 
permanent shock. The transition dynamics of returns to scale are equivalent to the markup. There is no strengthening effect 
from profits. 
4. Measured productivity 
The reduced-form optimal profit condition (35) gives the number of firms as a function of aggregate output, which in
turn can be used to remove the aggregate fixed cost component from the aggregate output expression (31) . Consequently,















F (K, L ) 
1 
ν . (46) 
The full derivation is in the appendix. This expression shows that aggregate output is a function of factor inputs and an
efficiency term that I refer to as measured TFP. 
Definition 2 (Measured TFP) . Measured TFP is the fraction of aggregate output that is not explained by factor inputs in
capital and labour where the denominator is adjusted to be homogeneous of degree 1: 
TFP ≡ Y 




I use the term ‘measured’ to recognise that this is the TFP one would acquire from a traditional Solow Residual mea-
surement exercise. Measured TFP is equivalent to a Solow Residual. That is, measured TFP equals to aggregate output less 
share-weighted factor inputs: 
ˆ TFP = ˆ Y − ˜ sK ˆ K − ˜ sL ̂  L , (48) 
where hat notation represents deviation from trend ( ̂  X ≡ ˙ X / ̃  X ) and steady-state factor shares are given by ˜ sK ≡ rK/P Y and
˜ sL ≡ wL/P Y . Steady-state factor shares in revenue and costs are equal due to zero-profit steady state. To show that measured
TFP is equivalent to a Solow Residual, log-linearize TFP = Y/F (K, L ) 1 /ν around steady-state to give 
ˆ TFP = ˆ Y − 1 
ν
(
˜ εF K ˆ K + ˜ εF L ̂  L 
)
. (49) 
In zero-profit steady state, output elasticities are given by ˜ εF K = ν ˜ sK and ˜ εF L = ν ˜ sL (see appendix). Hence, 
ˆ TFP = ˆ Y − ˜ sK ˆ K − ˜ sL ̂  L . (50) 
In the appendix I present the general relationship between output elasticities and factor shares. 
4.1. Measured TFP in steady state 
In steady-state measured TFP depends endogenously on the number of firms via the markup 
˜ T F P = ν
[ 
A 
μ( ̃  N ) 
(
μ( ̃  N ) − ν
φ
)1 −ν] 1 ν
(51) 23 In BGM the profit share (gross of entry costs) is always positive and μ > 1 . They do not have an overhead cost which in our model offsets profit, 
instead they have a fixed entry cost that equates to profit in the long run. In our model entry costs are zero in the long run. 
24 The production function parameters imply a flat marginal cost and globally downward sloping average cost. Hence there are globally increasing returns 
and equilibrium only exists with imperfect competition μ > 1 . There is no Walrasian benchmark at minimum efficient scale . 
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Since there are increasing returns in steady state and output per firm is increasing in entry, TFP is increasing in entry due
to increasing returns. 25 
Proposition 3. Steady-state measured TFP is increasing in the number of firms. 
4.2. Measured TFP decompositions 
Equation (46) shows that measured TFP is not equivalent to technology as the TFP term contains fixed parameters ν, φ
and endogenous variables π, μ. In this section, I present three decompositions of measured TFP that illustrate the channels 
through which measured TFP and underlying technology differ over time following a permanent technology shock. The 
diagrams are illustrative decompositions to show the dynamics exhibited in the decomposition equations. They are not 
numerical simulations. 
The first decomposition is simplest and most intuitive. It shows that measured TFP differs from underlying technology 
because firm-output variation (intensive margin) interacts with scale economies. The second and third decompositions go 
further in analyzing the components of intensive margin variation. In all three graphical illustrations the solid, black, hori- 
zontal line represents a permanent technology shock and the solid, blue, downward-sloping line represents measured TFP 
given the permanent technology shift. These two lines are equivalent to eachother in all three figures. The dashed lines 
represent the components of measured TFP which differ across each figure. The dashed lines sum to give the measured TFP
line. 
4.2.1. Measured TFP intensive margin decomposition 
The most intuitive expression for TFP follows from linearizing TFP expressed as TFP = y/ (y + φ) 1 /ν which yields 
ˆ TFP (t) = 1 
ν
ˆ A (t) + 
(
1 − 1 
˜ μ
)
ˆ y(t) . (52) 
The result shows that variations in TFP are due to underlying technology and a second term encompassing the interaction of
firm output variations with the markup, which equals RTS in steady state. 26 If ν < 1 , TFP overestimates technology regardless
of the second term. The second term is zero with either perfect competition ( ̃  μ = 1 ) or constant firm output ( ̂  y = 0 ). Under
perfect competition, firms operate at their minimum average cost where there are unit markups and constant returns ( ˜ RTS =
˜ μ = 1 ) so output variations do not affect TFP. 27 Under constant firm output, scale economies are irrelevant as scale is fixed.
Therefore, returns to scale and a markup do not necessarily cause TFP to incorrectly measure technology. For example, with 
monpolistic competition (constant markups) and instantaneous entry (zero profits) firm-level output is always fixed so the 
second term in the decomposition disappears. Furthermore, if ν = 1 then TFP and technology are equivalent. 
Figure 2 decomposes measured TFP transition into technology and intensive margin components following a permanent 
technology shock. The horizontal dashed line shows that 1 /ν amplifies the technology shock directly. The decreasing dashed 
line shows the adjustment in firm-level output. 
The variance and autocovariance of measured TFP fluctuations are 





var ( ̂  A t ) + 
(
1 − 1 
˜ μ
)2 





1 − 1 
˜ μ
)
cov ( ̂  A t , ̂  yt ) (53) 
cov 
(
ˆ TFP t , ˆ TFP t−1 
)
= 25 Under perfect competition ( ν < 1 and μ = 1 ) steady-state firm output is fixed at its minimum efficient scale (minimum AC) and TFP is maximized. 
26 The intensive margin coefficient is the price-cost margin (Lerner Index). 
27 For perfect competition to exist ν < 1 is necessary, so the ˆ A coefficient continues to amplify technology fluctuations. 
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ˆ yt , ̂  yt−1 
)
. (54) 
Given firm-level output and technology co-vary positively contemporaneously, the variance of ˆ TFP is greater than the vari- 
ance of technology ˆ A . If firm-level output and technology co-vary positively with a lead and lag, the autocovariance of 
measured TFP exceeds the autocovariance of technology. 
Special Cases: Perfect Competition and Monopolistic Competition 
The cases of perfect competition ( ν < 1 and μ = 1 ) and monopolistic competition ( ν ≤ 1 and μ > 1 ) with zero profits
(instantaneous entry) give the same variance and autocovariance for measured TFP and technology: 





var ( ̂  A ) and cov 
(









ˆ A t , ˆ A t−1 
)
. (55) 
Put another way, monopolistic competition with instantaneous entry has the same dynamics as perfect competition (at the 
first order), and there is no distortion between technology and TFP with ν = 1 . In the case of perfect competition, ˜ μ = 1
so the output variation coefficient is zero. In the case of monopolistic competition with instantaneous free entry there 
is no variation in output ˆ y = 0 to interact with the positive scale economies. 28 Therefore, in both cases the second term
in the linearized TFP expression is zero. This is the term that captures the interaction of intensive margin variations and
scale economies. The variance and covariance results imply that the autocorrelation of measured TFP and technology are 
equal regardless of ν . 29 Since the coefficient of an AR(1) model gives the autocorrelation, our numerical results show the 
invariance of autocorrelation to different values of ν . 
4.2.2. Measured TFP profit-markup decomposition 
Given the first basic decomposition into technology and firm output variation, we can now investigate further the drivers 
of firm output variation in the next two decompositions. Linearizing the reduced-form profit expression shows that output 
variations occur due to markup and profit variations: 30 




ˆ π(t) − 1 
˜ μ − ν ˆ μ(t) 
)
. (56) 
From this we can see that endogenous variation in markups and profit raise the variance of output. Their covariance further
reinforces the effect. 31 
















cov ( ̂  π, ˆ μ) . (57) 
Using our output expression in the basic decomposition, we can express TFP fluctuations as consisting of technology, markup 
and profit fluctuations: 
ˆ TFP (t) = 1 
ν
ˆ A (t) −
(
˜ μ − 1 
˜ μ − ν
)
ˆ μ(t) + 
(
˜ μ − 1 
νφ
)
ˆ π(t) (58) 
Figure 3 decomposes measured TFP transition into technology, markup and profit components following a permanent tech- 
nology shock. The horizontal dashed line shows that 1 /ν amplifies the technology shock directly. The decreasing dashed 
line shows an instantaneous increase in profits that decreases to zero in the long run. The increasing dashed line shows the
markup effect that begins at zero but increases as markups decrease. 
Dynamic firm entry causes the profit effect in the short run combined with oligopolistic competition causes the delay 
in the markup effect in the long run. The positive technology shock causes a gradual increase in the number of firms to a
permanently higher steady-state level. In the short run, the absence of entry means profits increase, free from arbitrage, and 
there is no markup effect because markups only respond to entry. In the long run, the entry of firms to arbitrage profits
removes the profit effect and causes a long-run markup effect as markups are permanently lower. If firm adjustment is fast,
the profit effect disappears quickly and the markup effect quickly dominates. 
Special Cases: The profit-markup decomposition is useful to pinpoint the two novel mechanisms in the model. If there 
were instantaneous entry and therefore zero profits, firm size is fixed each period as the number of firms is determined
instantaneously. In this case the measured TFP curve is horizontal at its current long-run asymptote, and consists of the 
direct technology component and markup component which is now flat rather than rising. There is no profit component. 
Similarly, if we also assume markups are fixed, then the markups component disappears too and measured TFP is equal 28 Fixed output occurs because ˆ μ = 0 and ˆ π = 0 . We could represent thee variance and autocovarance in ˆ A t , ̂  μt , ̂  πt terms rather than ˆ A t , ̂  yt . The cost is 
many more covariates. 
29 To see this plug the variance and covariance of ˆ TFP into the autocorrelation formula: cov ( ˆ TFP t , ˆ TFP t−1 ) / 
√ 
var ( ˆ TFP t ) var ( ˆ TFP t−1 ) . 
30 Since profits are zero in steady state ˜ π = 0 , our notation for linearized profits is ˆ π = ˙ π , rather than ˆ y = ˙ y/ ̃ y and ˆ μ = ˙ μ/ ̃ μ (and all other hat variables). 
31 The covariance of profits and markups is negative because as profits jump postively on impact markups do not deviate from trend, but as firms enter 
to bring profits back to trend, the markup deviates negatively away from trend. 
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Fig. 3. Measured TFP decomposition, markups and profits. 
Fig. 4. Measured TFP decomposition, factor inputs. 
 
 
to the existing dashed horizontal line. Lastly, if there were constant markups but dynamic entry (non-zero profits), the 
measured TFP curve would be composed of the downward-sloping profit effect and direct technology effect, which it would 
converge on in the long-run as profits disappeared. 
4.2.3. Measured TFP factor-input decomposition 
If we log-linearize firm output directly, we can see it varies through technology, capital, labour and number of firms: 




− ˆ N (t) + ˜ sK ˆ K (t) + ˜ sL ̂  L (t) 
)
. (59) 
Hence, TFP fluctuations consist of four components: 
ˆ TFP (t) = ˜ μ
ν
ˆ A (t) + ( ̃  μ − 1 ) 
(
˜ sK ˆ K (t) + ˜ sL ̂  L (t) − ˆ N (t) 
)
. (60) 
Figure 4 emphasizes the important role of labour increasing on impact. This drives the short-run profit response in the 
second decomposition and the short-run output response in the first decomposition. On impact of a technology shock, the 
state variables are fixed ˆ K (0) = ˆ N (0) = 0 but labour ˆ L (0) jumps. Equation (38) shows that the labour jump is driven by a
the shock to ˆ A and a movement of ˆ C . Labour increases on impact if the direct technology effect offsets the negative effect
of a rise in consumption. 32 32 The illustration shows ˆ L converging to zero. This is a special case that occurs with log consumption utility such that ε u C C = −1 in (38) . Income and 
substitution effects cancel out such that a change in technology has no effect on long-run labour. 
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4.3. Estimating technology 
We can derive a model-consistent technology series by log-linearizing the aggregate production function around steady- 
state and then re-arranging. Log-linearized aggregate output is 
ˆ Y = ˜ μ
ν
ˆ A + ˜ μ˜ sK ˆ K + ˜ μ˜ sL ̂  L + (1 − ˜ μ) ̂  N . (61) 
We can remove the capital share using the zero-profit steady-state result ˜ sK + ̃  sL = 1 . 33 Then rearranging for technology
gives 
ˆ A = ν
˜ μ
[
ˆ Y − ˜ μ˜ sL ( ̂ L − ˆ K ) − ˜ μ ˆ K − (1 − ˜ μ) ̂  N 
]
. (62) 
This derivation of technology is the correct measure for other models with imperfect competition and non-constant marginal 
cost. 34 The measure of technology is equivalent to measured TFP (Solow Residual) when ν = ˜ μ = 1 : ˆ TFP = ˆ Y − ˜ sL ̂ L − ˜ sK ̂  K .
However, this case is not permissible in our model due to the fixed cost term. 35 
4.3.1. Data and calibration for technology 
To acquire our technology series we need detrended time series for capital ˆ K , labour ˆ L and number of firms ˆ N . We also
need to assign values to the steady-state labour share ˜ sL , steady-state markup ˜ μ, and the degree of returns to variable inputs
ν . 36 
Technology series data 
I use data for the US from 1992 Q3 - 2018 Q4 at a quarterly frequency. For aggregate output, I use real, seasonally-
adjusted, GDP in 2012 prices from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). For labour, I use quarterly hours of all persons
in the nonfarm business sector from the Bureau of Labour Statistic (BLS). For capital, I use annual capital services for the
private non-farm business sector (excluding government enterprises) from the BLS. I linearly interpolate capital services to 
get quarterly data. For number of firms, I use quarterly number of establishments from the BLS BED. I remove population
trends by converting data to per capita terms using BLS population level data. I use a quadratic detrend on the logged
data to obtain ˆ K , ̂  L , ˆ N , which in turn yields ˆ A . The empirical counterpart to the continuous-time, log-linearized, variables in
deviation from steady state ˆ X = ˙ X / ̃  X is the logged data less the trend in the logged data, all scaled by 100 to give percentage
units. The resulting series ˆ X = [ ln X t − p( ln X t )] × 100 , where p(·) is the trend, are approximate percentage deviations from
trend. 
Technology series calibrated parameters 
I assume the labour share is ˜ sL = 0 . 7 which is a common approximation for the US labour share ( Jaimovich and Floe-
totto, 2008 ). The parameter ν is more unusual. It represents the slope of the marginal cost curve or the sum of output elas-
ticities (net of the fixed cost) ν = ε F K + ε F  . I follow Atkeson and Kehoe (2005) who have a similar model setup. They use
ν = 0 . 95 based on surveying production function estimation literature, which is close to calibrations used by Restuccia and
Rogerson (2008) and recent estimates by Ruzic and Ho (2019) . 37 The markup μ( ̃  N ) is not a fixed parameter. It is determined
endogenously as a function of steady-state number of firms, which is a nonlinear function of model parameters, and it is
directly affected by between-industry θI and between-firm θF product substitutability. I calibrate the markup to ˜ μ = 1 . 3 for 
the technology process and I use this as a steady-state target in my simulations. This value is consistent with recent esti-
mates for the US by Hall (2018) and is consistent with Jaimovich and Floetotto (2008) . I study the effect of a high markup
˜ μ = 1 . 5 and low markup ˜ μ = 1 . 1 on the technology properties below. 
4.3.2. Technology series properties 
In Table 2 and Figure 5 (a), we show how different values of steady-state markup ˜ μ affect the unconditional variance of
our detrended technology series. A higher value of ˜ μ raises the variance. The second column in Table 2 represents measured
TFP (Solow Residual) since our adjusted TFP measure equals the Solow Residual when ν = μ = 1 , and Figure 5 benchmarks
against this value. 38 The results are consistent with our decomposition that for a given variation in technology there is a33 Not removing ˜ sK gives ˆ A = ν˜ μ
[
ˆ Y − ˜ μ˜ sL ̂ L − ˜ μ˜ sk ̂  K − (1 − ˜ μ) ̂ N 
]
. 
34 It is invariant to the presence of dynamic entry or endogenous markups. Though the endogenous markup means the markup term μ is evaluated at its 
steady-state value which depends on the steady-state number of firms, rather than being a constant parameter. Also, the presence of a fixed costs φ does 
not affect the technology expression explicitly. The fixed cost is subsumed in the factor shares, which are shares in output Y which deducts fixed costs. 
35 The reduced-form equilibrium condition ν(1 + ̃  sφ ) = ˜ μ(1 − ˜ sπ ) cannot hold with zero profits, unit markup and flat marginal cost, unless fixed costs are 
zero. 
36 Alternatively, we could use ˜ μν = 1 + ̃  sφ where ˜ sφ = φ/ ̃ y, if we preferred to specify the steady-state fixed-cost share. In either case, we must specify two 
out of the three terms: ˜ sφ, ̃  μ, ν . 
37 Atkeson and Kehoe (2005) specify ν/μ = 0 . 85 implying a markup of μ = 0 . 95 / 0 . 85 = 1 . 11 . Since there are no fixed costs, by ν/μ = (1 − s π ) / (1 + s φ ) , 
the ratio implies 15% profit share. 
38 Holding ˜ μ = 1 , we see that the decrease in the technology series variance as ν decreases from 1 to 0.95 is consistent with theory var ( ̂ A ) = ν2 var ( ̂  SR ) , 
that is 2 . 3204 = 0 . 95 2 × 2 . 5711 . We can also see the invariance of the autocorrelation term as ν changes from 1 to 0.95. 
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Table 2 
Technology Series Properties (quadratic detrend and s L = 0 . 7 ). 
ν 1 0.95 
˜ μ 1 1 1.1 1.3 1.5 
σ 2 ( ̂ A ) 2.5711 2.3204 2.3237 2.3612 2.4138 
AR(1) Estimates 
ρ ˆ A 0.9755 0.9755 0.9793 0.9839 0.9863 
σ 2 ε 0.2305 0.2080 0.1824 0.1497 0.1311 











larger variation in measured TFP. The second and third rows report the properties of the adjusted technology series from 
fitting the following AR(1) model to the derived series: 
ˆ A t = ρ ˆ A ˆ A t−1 + εt , εt 
iid ∼ N 
(
0 , σ 2 ε
)
. (63) 
The results show that the variance of the AR(1) error term is decreasing in the markup. 
5. Simulations 
I simulate a discrete-time version of the model using the technology series we identified in the previous section. 
5.1. Model calibration 
To acquire technology I assigned values to the labour share, markup and marginal cost slope ˜ sL , ˜ μ, ν . The labour share
and markup are endogenously determined in the model so we shall use them as targets when calibrating other parameters. 
I assume an isoelastic utility function and a Cobb-Douglas production function that is homogeneous of degree ν ≡ α + β . 
The α and β parameters are output elasticities to capital and labour: 
U(C, L ) = C 
1 −σ
1 − σ − ξ
L 1+ η
1 + η and F (k,  ) = k 
α β . (64) 
The parameter η is the inverse Frisch elasticity which I set according to Bilbiie et al. (2012) ; Etro and Colciago (2010) ;
King and Rebelo (1999) , all of whom use the same utility function and also set σ = 1 to give logarithmic utility in con-
sumption such that income and substitution effects cancel out. I also follow this literature for the discrete-time discount 
factor which corresponds to quarterly time periods. I set the between-sector and between-firm substitutability to reflect 
homogeneous firms within unique industries. This is consistent with Jaimovich and Floetotto (2008) , which is also close to
Etro and Colciago (2010) and other papers with oligopolistic competition ( Atkeson and Burstein, 2008 ). Generally authors 
set the between-industry substitutability to be close to 1, implying perfectly differentiated industries, and the between-firm 
substitutability to be large, implying homogeneous firms. In the appendix I present the scenarios covered in the literature 
and also present further numerical results on the sensitivity of the markup and markup elasticity to number of firms for
different calibrations of these parameters. I choose ξ such that steady-state labour is one-third ˜ L = 1 / 3 . The more notewor-
thy parameters for our analysis are those that relate to scale economies α, β, φ and firm adjustment ζ . I set the marginal
cost slope (sum of output elasticities) to ν = 0 . 95 . This is influenced by micro-production literature that conducts detailed
estimation of production function elasticities on firm-level data, and is notably adopted by Atkeson and Kehoe (2005) and 
confirmed in recent estimates by Ruzic and Ho (2019) . A useful robustness check follows from the equilibrium profit con-
dition: ν/μ = (1 − s π ) / (1 + s φ ) . In steady-state profits are zero, and we target a markup of ˜ μ = 1 . 3 , thus the implied fixed17 
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cost share is 0.37 in steady-state and strictly lower with positive profits that would occur in transition. De Loecker et al.
(2020 , p. 616) estimate the US fixed cost share to be 0.24 and De Ridder (2019) finds a similar figure. 39 Hence our calibra-
tion implies a marginally larger fixed cost share, which can be rationalised by the model assumption that profits are zero
in steady state which was important for tractability. 40 The ν calibration implies values for the production function elastic- 
ities α and β in zero-profit steady-state. Specifically, the factor market equilibrium conditions imply that in steady-state 
β = ˜ εF L = ˜ sL ν = 0 . 7 × 0 . 95 = 0 . 665 and α = ˜ εF K = (1 − ˜ sL ) ν = 0 . 3 × 0 . 95 = 0 . 285 , where the labour share is set to 0.7 as is
standard for the U.S. economy and also consistent with my technology estimation exercise. The entry congestion parameter 
ζ controls the speed of adjustment of firms – it is not present in steady state – therefore I set it such that the simulated im-
pulse response function (IRF) for firms matches the IRF from the motivating VAR exercise. The model-simulated IRF matches 
the timing of the peak response well. As in the data it takes eight quarters for the maximum firm response to occur, but
the effect then persists for longer. This is driven by the persistence of the technology shock which is greater in the model
exercise than the VAR exercise. I calibrate the fixed cost φ to meet a steady-state target for the markup of 1.3 as recently
estimated by Hall (2018) for the US and used in theoretical work by Jaimovich and Floetotto (2008) . The fixed cost controls
˜ N and in turn the markup. Lastly, I set the persistence and innovation variance of the technology process according to the
results in Table 2 when ˜ μ = 1 . 3 . 
5.2. Model results 
The impulse response functions from our simulated model reflect the dynamics of our VAR analysis. Following a one 
unit shock to technology, there is an immediate strong response in aggregate output, but the adjustment of firms begins 
small and increases over time. Consequently there is a short-run jump in the intensive margin activity of incumbent firms ŷ
which interacts with returns to scale causing an additional endogenous productivity effect on top of the technology shock. 
The measured TFP response exceeds underlying technology by 50% on impact. The increase in incumbent firm size on impact 
means firms utilise their fixed costs and returns to scale. Consequently the fixed-cost share and returns to scale decrease 
on impact closer to constant returns to scale. Subsequently as the initial intensive margin expansion declines the fixed cost 
share and returns to scale measures return to their higher values. 39 Both measure the overhead cost share in total costs not total revenue, but in our setup in steady-state profits are zero so revenue and cost shares are 
equivalent. 
40 A 0.1 profit share in steady state would reduce the implied fixed cost share to 0.23. This could be achieved if the model were extended to include 
exogenous firm death such that profits must be positive in steady state to induce entry that replenishes the exogenously dying firms. 
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Fig. 7. IRF model comparison. 
 
 
As we showed in our qualitative decompositions, we can decompose the expansion in firm-level output into markup 
and profit variation or factor-input variation. Initially the firm-level output expansion corresponds to a proportional jump in 
operating profits because firm entry is yet to adjust, so all the expansion is accrued to incumbents as profits. But over time
firms enter stealing profits and decreasing markups. Notably the profit effect disappears by 10 quarters which coincides with 
the markup effect reaching its maximum. The markup decreases slowly in response to competition from new entry. This 
buoys firm-level output leading to the persistent endogenous productivity effect. The fall in markups causes the resilience 
in incumbents’ output because they must produce more in order to cover their fixed costs of production, given they now
have a smaller markup on each unit they sell. 
Entry creates opposing effects on the firm intensive margin and consequently the endogenous productivity effect. On the 
one hand, entry leads to business stealing which diminishes operating profits, output per firm and consequently productivity. 
On the other hand, entry leads to a competition effect which decreases markups, raising output per firm and strengthening 
the endogenous productivity effect. 
The final three panels (middle-right and bottom two) interpret the output expansions in terms of factor inputs. The 
middle-right demonstrates that on impact – when there is no firm entry – expansion in the intensive margin and expansion 19 
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in aggregate output are equivalent: all aggregate output expansion is due to incumbents raising their output. Subsequently 
as firms enter the role of the firm-level intensive margin expansion diminishes and the differences between the ˆ Y and ŷ
curves shows the growing importance of new entrants’ output contribution to the aggregate. The same logic applies to 
labour, which is the only factor of production that is able to adjust on impact and therefore on impact causes all the
output expansion which is not caused directly by the ˆ A shock. Then as entry adjusts the emerging gap between ˆ  and ˆ L
represents the growing importance of new firms in the composition of aggregate hours. Rather than working more hours at 
an incumbent firm as they do initially, over time workers setup new firms and allocate hours to these. 
The bottom two panels show the components of aggregate output and firm-level (intensive margin) output (excluding ˆ A 
component). They emphasize that all of the short-run effect occurs through hours adjusting since both capital and firms are 
fixed state variables on impact. This also explains the equal response of aggregate output and firm level output on impact. 
5.3. Model comparison 
I compare four versions of the model that isolate each key model mechanism in turn. The full model has oligopolistic
competition and dynamic entry. I compare this to the model with oligopolistic competition and static entry and the model 
with monopolistic competition and dynamic entry. The benchmark model has neither model feature: it has monopolistic 
competition and static entry. The dynamics of a benchmark monopolistic competition model are the same as an RBC model. 
The only distortion in such models are static and occur in steady state. Therefore the IRFs for the static entry monopolistic
competition model are identical to the perfect competition RBC model. The models are all simulated with the same cali- 
bration of persistence and variance for the technology process. The technology series we have identified is correct for all 
models regardless of whether there is dynamic or static entry or monopolistic or oligopolistic competition. The calibration 
from Table 3 is the same for all models, except in the monopolistic competition case the markup is constant μ = θI / (θI − 1)
and I calibrate it to equal 1.3 by setting θI = 4 . 33 . This is the endogenously determined level of the markup with oligopolistic
competition. With static entry there are no entry adjustment costs therefore ζ = 0 . The steady-state outcomes are identical 20 
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Fig. 9. Markup properties θI = 1 . 
Table 3 
Parameter values. 
Capital Elast. α 0.285 
Labour Elast. β 0.665 
Fixed Cost φ 0.070 
Entry Congestion ζ 0.100 
Risk Aversion σ 1.000 
Discount Factor  0.990 
Labour Weight ξ 2.760 
Labour Elast. η 0.250 
Industry (inter) Subs. θI 1.001 
Firm (intra) Subs. θF 19.600 
Tech. Persist. ρ ˆ A 0.979 




across all four models. This is because we set the markup to be the same and the dynamic entry feature has no effect on
steady state. 
The ˆ TFP and ˆ y panels show that the addition of dynamic entry to the baseline model causes a more pronounced short-run 
effect than the addition of oligopolistic competition. After approximately 3 quarters, the oligopolistic competition effect on 
firm-level output dominates the profit effect from dynamic entry effect leading to a less volatile but more persistent effect 
on ˆ y. This can be seen by comparing the IRFs for the two intermediate cases: dynamic entry with monopolistic competition
and static entry with oligopolistic competition. 
Table 4 reports HP-filtered (smoothing parameter λ = 1600 ) theoretical model standard deviations. The results show that 
dynamic entry causes a large increase in measured TFP volatility relative to model variants with static entry, but once 
dynamic entry is assumed the form of strategic interaction plays little role. The increase in the volatility of measured TFP21 
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Table 4 
Model standard deviation comparison. 
Static Entry Dynamic Entry 
Monop. Oligop. Monop. Oligop. 
σ (Y ) 2.3591 2.8950 2.6977 2.7518 








relative to the benchmark static entry monopolistic competition model is 38%. In terms of aggregate output fluctuations, 
the full model generates 17% more variation in output than the benchmark model. However, the greatest amplification of 
aggregate output occurs in the model with static entry and oligopolistic competition. This is consistent with the IRFs which 
show a strong response of aggregate labour and in turn aggregate output for this variant of the model. 
6. Conclusion 
The paper investigates the effect of firm entry on measured productivity over the business cycle. I consider that entry is
non-instantaneous leading to temporary profits and entry affects the price markups that incumbents charge. Together with 
increasing returns to scale, these mechanisms can explain short-run procylical measured productivity following a technol- 
ogy shock. I provide an analytical decomposition of measured productivity into the component that is driven by exogenous 
technology and the component that is driven by firm-level output decisions interacting with increasing returns to scale. 
I then extend this main result to show the quantitative relevance of the model mechanism. A problem in traditional real
business cycle modelling is that the model’s internal amplification is weak, so a highly variable exogenous technology series 
is required to generate observed output fluctuations. The results in this paper imply that the combination of dynamic entry, 
endogenous markups and returns to scale generate a less volatile and more persistent technology series. Furthermore, recent 
trends in U.S. market structures towards higher markups and returns to scale and lower business dynamism will strengthen 
these results such that output is more responsive to true technology shocks and measured TFP is more volatile than true un-
derlying technology. From a policy perspective, the main take-away is that by ignoring these mechanisms output responses 
to technology shocks are significantly dampened relative to a benchmark model of imperfect competition and measured TFP 
fluctuations are more volatile than underlying technology fluctuations. 
Appendix A. Output elasticities and factor shares 
Factor shares are related to production function elasticites as follows 
s L = ε F L 
(1 + s φ ) 
μ
= ε F L (1 − s π ) 
ν
and s K = ε F K 
(1 + s φ ) 
μ
= ε F K (1 − s π ) 
ν
where shares are in revenue terms. When evaluated at zero-profit steady state revenue (R) and cost (C) shares, s R / (1 − s π ) =
s C , are equal and output elasticity to an input is equal to the product of ν and total expenditure of the input in revenue
or cost. Notice that this is the popular ratio-estimator of the markup. That is, the markup is the ratio of output elasticity
ε Y L = ε F L (1 + s φ ) to the input share s L , thus μ = ε Y L /s L . 
Derivation 
Take factor market equilibrium w = AN 1 −νμ F L and multiply by L AN 1 −νF = 
L 
Y + Nφ to give 
wL 
Y + Nφ = 
ε F L 
μ , then noting our definition
for factor shares and fixed-cost share, gives s L 
1 
1+ s φ = 
ε F L 
μ then rearrange for production function elasticities. The process is 
symmetric for wage and rental markets. Hence 
ε F L = μ
(1 + s φ ) 
s L , ε F K = μ
(1 + s φ ) 
s K , 
Additionally from the profit condition under firms optimizing choices 
1 − s π = ν
μ
(1 + s φ ) (= s L + s K ) 
Therefore 
ε F L = ν s L , ε F K = ν s L . 
(1 − s π ) (1 − s π ) 
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Appendix B. Reduced-form aggregate production function 
We can obtain reduced-form aggregate output by removing the number of firms N from the aggregate production func- 
tion using the maximized profit equation. The aggregate production function is 
Y = N 1 −νAF (K, L ) − Nφ. 
The aggregate budget constraint under optimal factor prices is: 





(Y + N φ) − N φ. 


























F (K, L ) 
1 
ν








ν −1 (π + νμφ). 
Appendix C. Identifying Technology 
If we log-linearize the expression for aggregate output we get 
ln Y = ln [ AN 1 −νF (K, L ) − Nφ] 





˙ A + Y + Nφ
N 
(1 − ν) ̇ N + Y + Nφ
F (K, L ) 
(F K ˙ K + F L ̇ L ) − φ ˙ N 
]
ˆ Y = (1 + s φ ) ̂  A + (1 + s φ ) ε F K ˆ K + (1 + s φ ) ε F L ̂  L + (1 − ν(1 + s φ )) ̂  N 
where s φ ≡ NφY , ε F K = F K K F and ε F L = F L L F . Hence replacing elasticities in terms of factor shares, log-linearized output can be
written: 
ˆ Y = μ(1 − s π ) 
ν
ˆ A + μs K ˆ K + μs L ̂  L + (1 − μ(1 − s π )) ̂  N 
where s π ≡ πN Y , s K ≡ rK Y and s L ≡ wL Y . Evaluating coefficients at steady state where ˜ sπ = 0 gives 
ˆ Y = ˜ μ
ν
ˆ A + ˜ μ˜ sK ˆ K + ˜ μ˜ sL ̂  L + (1 − ˜ μ) ̂  N . 
Furthermore, in steady state ˜ sL + ̃  sK = 1 which allows us to express in terms of labour shares 
ˆ Y = ˜ μ
ν
ˆ A + ˜ μ˜ sL ( ̂ L − ˆ K ) + ˜ μ ˆ K + (1 − ˜ μ) ̂  N 
Either of these expressions can be rearranged to provide a true technology series ˆ A . 
ˆ A = ν
˜ μ
[
ˆ Y − ˜ μ˜ sK ˆ K − ˜ μ˜ sL ̂  L − (1 − ˜ μ) ̂  N 
]
ˆ A = ν
˜ μ
[
ˆ Y − ˜ μ˜ sL ( ̂ L − ˆ K ) − ˜ μ ˆ K − (1 − ˜ μ) ̂  N 
]
C1. Endogenous markup literature survey 
Table 5 surveys the intersectoral θI and intrasectoral θF substitutability parameters used in the literature and Table 6 
gives the corresponding markup and markup elasticity to entry under these restrictions. In the main paper we present 
results for quantity competition (Cournot). A common alternative that yields a closely related markup is to solve for price 
competition (Bertrand). 23 
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Table 5 
Endogenous markup calibration literature survey. 
θI θF 
Cournot 
Atkeson and Burstein (2008 , p.2015) 1.01 10.0 
Jaimovich and Floetotto (2008 , App p.15) a 1.001 ∞ 
Etro and Colciago (2010 , p.1215) 1.0 6 . 0 , 20 . 0 , ∞ 
Colciago and Etro (2010 , p.1104) b 1.0 ∞ 
Bertrand 
Jaimovich and Floetotto (2008 , p.1248) c 1.001 19.6 
Etro and Colciago (2010 , p.1216) 1.0 6 . 0 , 20 . 0 
Lewis and Poilly (2012 , p.678) d 1.00 e 2.624 
a Brito et al. (2013) ; Portier (1995) also use Cournot with homoge- 
neous goods but differentiated industries. 
b Homogeneous goods and unitary elasticity is common in theoretical 
papers e.g. Dos Santos Ferreira and Dufourt (2006) ; Opp et al. (2014) ; 
Peters (2020) . 
c Jaimovich and Floetotto (2008 , p.1248) specify their nested CES ag- 
gregators as a p-norm τ and Holder conjugate ω, rather than elasticities, 
hence θI = 1 1 −ω = 1 1 −0 . 001 = 1 . 001 and θF = 1 1 −τ = 1 1 −0 . 949 = 19 . 6 . 
d Lewis and Poilly (2012 , p.680) plot their competition effect for a do- 
main of substitutabilities θI , θF ∈ (1 . 0 , 4 . 0) 2 . 
e Estimated value to 2 decimal places. 
Table 6 
Endogenous Markup. 









Atkeson and Burstein 1 
1 − 1 
θF 


























Colciago and Etro N 





















Jaimovich and Floetotto θI + θF (N−1) 
(θF −1) N−(θF −θI ) 
Etro and Colciago 1+ θF (N−1) 
(θF −1)(N−1) 
Lewis and Poilly θI + θF (N−1) 
(θF −1) N−(θF −θI ) 
a θF does not affect the markups elasticity to number of firms when there is unitary 





C2. Graphical illustration of markup properties 
The following plots show the effect of the substitutability parameters on the level of the markup and its elasticity to
new firm entry. 
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